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Resumen 
 
La Zona Económica Exclusiva de 200 millas náuticas de extensión, creada en 1982 
por la Convención del Mar, genera conflicto en áreas donde la distancia entre costas 
nacionales opuestas es menor a 400 millas náuticas y en los mares marginales rodeados 
por muchos estados y con islas. Este es el caso de los mares marginales de los Océanos 
Índico y Pacifico. En particular, el régimen de la ZEE ha sido problemático en el Mar de la 
China Meridional, llevando a algunos autores a preguntarse si ha fortalecido o debilitado de 
hecho las perspectivas de paz y cooperación. ¿Es realmente la Convención del Mar el 
problema? Mi propósito aquí es explicar que, en verdad, la Convención del Mar es un hito 
en el proceso de territorialización del mar. El régimen de la ZEE representa el equilibrio 
entre presiones opuestas que vienen de los Estados costeros y los terceros estados, 
generalmente las potencias marítimas; sin embargo, y a pesar del hecho de que, de 
acuerdo a la Convención del Mar, los Estados costeros ejercen derechos soberanos y no 
soberanía en la ZEE, se argumentará aquí que los Estados costeros en la práctica se 
comportan como si sus ZEE fueran su propio territorio soberano. Esto es particularmente 
cierto en las áreas contenciosas de los Océanos Índico y Pacífico.  
 
Palabras clave: Territorialización, Fronteras, UNCLOS, Océano índio 
 
Abstract 
The 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone created by the 1982 UNCLOS 
regime generates conflict in areas where the distance between opposite national coasts is 
less than 400 nautical miles and in marginal seas surrounded by many states and with 
islands. This is the case of the marginal seas in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In particular, 
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the EEZ regime has proved troublesome in the South China Sea, leading some authors to 
ask whether it has actually strengthened or undermined peace and cooperation. Does the 
problem really lie with UNCLOS? My purpose hereby is to explain that, in truth, UNCLOS is 
a milestone in the process of territorialization of the seas. The EEZ regime represents the 
balance between the opposing pressures coming from the coastal States and the third 
states, generally the maritime powers; however, and in spite of the fact that, pursuant to 
LOS Convention, coastal States enjoy sovereign rights and not sovereignty in the EEZ, it will 
be argued here that coastal States do in practice behave with respect to their EEZs as if 
they were their own sovereign territory.This is particularly true of the contentious areas of the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
 
Key words:Territorialization; Borders; Territory; UNCLOS; IndianOcean 
 
Introduction  
The Asian Rimland is delineated by a series of geographic features: the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent; the Malay Peninsula, the Indonesian archipelago, the 
Philippine archipelago, Taiwan; the Japanese archipelago, the Kurile Islands and the 
Kamchatka Peninsula. As a result, the Indian and Pacific oceans are subdivided into several 
marginal seas: the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea; the Bay of Bengal and 
the Andaman Sea; the Java Sea, the Celebes Sea and the Philippine Sea; the South and 
East China Seas; the Yellow Sea; and the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, etc. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the SEA (UNCLOS), also called the 
Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention), established zones of functional jurisdiction 
that extend seaward from coastal States baselines: the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf (LOS Convention, 1982: Arts. 
3-16, 33, 55-75, 76-85).  
The 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone is particularly relevant, for it is 
neither part of the territorial sea nor part of the high seas, but has a sui generis status; in the 
EEZ, the coastal States enjoy certain specific sovereign rights to explore and exploit its 
natural living and non-living resources, on the seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters. 
“Sovereign rights” is a notion distinct from sovereignty (LOS Convention, 1982: Arts. 55-56; 
Beckman and Davenport, 2012: 7-8). Sovereign rights are not rights deriving from 
sovereignty but rights of specific functional purpose (Kopela, 2009). The nature of the EEZ 
regime is critical because it embraces a third of the marine environment. Indeed, all of the 
important seas and gulfs of the world are composed entirely or mainly of waters within 200 
pág. 52 
 
 ISSN: 2362-194X       Journal de Ciencias Sociales Año 5 N° 9 
miles of the coast of some state and the majority of the world’s shipping routes pass through 
them (Beckman and Davenport, 2012: 5-6; Oxman, 2006:839). 
  The EEZ regime was supported during the negotiations leading to UNCLOS by Latin 
American states. However, this 200-nautical-mile area was going to generate conflict in 
areas where the distance between opposite national coasts is less than 400 nautical miles 
and in marginal seas surrounded by many states and with islands (Song and Tønnesson, 
2013:239; Kopela, 2009:2), as is the case of the abovementioned marginal seas in the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. In particular, the EEZ regime has proved troublesome in the 
South China Sea, leading some authors to ask whether it has actually strengthened or 
undermined peace and cooperation (Song and Tønnesson, 2013:237). 
 Does the problem really lie with UNCLOS? My purpose hereby is to explain that, in 
truth, UNCLOS is a milestone in the process of territorialization of the seas: the EEZ regime 
represents the balance between the opposing pressures coming from the coastal States and 
the third states, generally the maritime powers; however, and in spite of the fact that, 
pursuant to LOS Convention, coastal States enjoy sovereign rights and not sovereignty in 
the EEZ, it will be argued that coastal States do in practice behave with respect to their 
EEZs as if they were their own sovereign territory. This is especially true of the contentious 
areas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.In order to do that, I will proceed as follows: 
In Part I, I will introduce certain theoretical concepts from the study of borders, such 
as borders as markers of territorial rule, borders as membranes, and as defining lines for the 
formation of identities (Kuzmits, 2013). These are originally meant to help understand land 
borders, but I will argue that their logic can be applied also to the seas. In Part II, I will 
describe the phenomenon of territorialization of the seas and explain its relation to the EEZ 
regime. In Part III, I will present some indicators of how coastal States in the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans territorialize their EEZs: by introducing “creeping jurisdiction” that restricts 
freedoms of third States recognized in the LOS Convention, by displaying their capacity to 
control the space and also by paying careful attentionto naming.In addition to the 
conclusions, I will comment on how IR theories standin reference to borders and how this 
reflects on narratives about the Indian and Pacific Oceans.  
 
I. Borders and territory 
 In Borders and Orders in Central Asia…, Bernd Kuzmits explains that the desire for 
well-defined fixed borders was a direct consequence of the idea of exclusive and 
uncontested territorial state power that emerged in the nineteenth century (Kuzmits, 2013: 
30). Moreover, the concepts of territoriality of rule and sovereignty are bound to borders, 
because “territoriality is the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control 
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people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a 
geographical area” (Kuzmits, 2013: 38). 
 Kuzmits(2013) introduces “three salient functions of borders that come out of the 
narratives of borders and orders”: borders as markers of territorial rule, borders as 
membranes, and borders defining identity lines (34-36). 
 The boundaries of a state determine the crucial legal distinction between the 
domestic sphere and the realm of foreign relations. Political borders not only separate but 
also mediate contacts between social groups. A state’s claim on the regulation of contacts 
and the exertion of power becomes more visible at borders; here, states and their 
representatives are eager to display their capacity to control a space by fencing off their 
sovereign territory, by erecting checkpoints and by staffing borders with agents of control. 
Moreover, Kuzmits (2013) observes that according to cultural theorists, borders are 
effectively projection screens for theatrical performances, enabling states to assert 
themselves in front of internal and international audiences at once. 
 The function of borders as membranes relates to permeability. It is through borders 
that goods, peoples and ideas are filtered. It is to be noticed that the concepts of borders as 
markers and membranes are in fact closely interrelated. Because borders mark the 
threshold between inside and outside, they offer the opportunity to decide which goods, 
persons and ideas may pass and which are undesirable, at least where the movement can 
be controlled (Kuzmits, 2013).  
Whereas the first two functions relate to physical phenomena, the third brings in the 
sociocultural dimension and conceptualizes borders as social constructs. Physical borders 
coincide with cognitive or identity border lines (Kuzmits, 2013: 36). 
 Even though Kuzmits is thinking of land borders when introducing these functions of 
borders, it can be argued that coastal states intend to apply an analogous logic in the 
maritime zones where they can exert jurisdiction, as follows: 
1) Coastal States try to monitor and patrol, either with a navy fleet, aircraft, island 
infrastructure, etc., their adjacent seas in order to exert some degree of control of movement 
or at least to assert their presence for everyone, both foreigners and nationals (theatrical 
performance). 
2) Coastal States are tempted to pass national legislation requiring, for example, 
prior authorization for transit, claiming jurisdiction on hydrographic surveys, infrastructure 
and even customs, and restricting navigational freedom. Particularly contentious is the issue 
of military-related, or potentially military-related activities. 
3) Coastal States are concerned also about their adjacent seas in sociocultural 
terms. The most obvious example that I will refer to is naming. Argentineans and Chileans 
call their adjacent seas Argentinean and Chilean sea, respectively. In Asia, by means of 
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example, the South China Sea is called East Sea by the Vietnamese. It is easy to see that 
political implications differ in the case of each name. 
 
II. The territorial temptation at sea2 
 Bernard H. Oxman(2006) considers that the history of international law since the 
Peace of Westphalia is in significant measure an account of the “territorial temptation”: the 
insistent quest for supremacy of the territorial state, based on the assumption that territorial 
control brings with it control over important sources of sustenance or danger for the state 
and its people (p. 830). 
According to Oxman (2006), whereas the history of the international law of the land 
can be characterized by the progressive triumph of the territorial temptation, the history of 
the law of the sea until the mid-twentieth century has seen the advancement of Grotius’s 
thesis of mare liberum. The freedom of navigation reflected the transitory nature of human 
activity at sea. The Convention on the High Seas (1958) defined the high seas as “all parts 
of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State” (Art. 
1). This elaboration represented the peak of the Grotian spirit.  
However, from the second half of the twentieth century on, the territorial temptation 
moved seaward. The notion of the tragedy of the commons prompted political pressure on 
coastal states to find ways to protect local fishing industries facing foreign competition for a 
limited resource (Oxman, 2006).3 
At the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took 
place between 1973 and 1982, the coastal States, in particular Latin American states, 
wanted to make the EEZ subject to the sovereignty of the coastal States, but provided that 
other States had certain rights and freedoms. The maritime powers on the other hand, 
wanted the zone to be part of the high seas, but provide that coastal States had the 
sovereign right to explore and exploit the natural resources in the zone. The compromise 
was to reject both options, and create a sui generis legal regime, whereby coastal States 
have sovereign rights. The phrase “sovereign rights” makes it clear that the coastal States 
do not have sovereignty, and do not have residual jurisdiction to regulate matters in the EEZ. 
Their jurisdiction is limited to those set out in UNCLOS (Beckman and Davenport, 2012: 6-
9). 
2 The title of this part is taken and adapted from Oxman (2006). 
3 Cf. Beckman and Davenport(2012):  
“The negotiations (for the EEZ) were characterized by the traditional dichotomy between coastal 
States and the major maritime powers that has always shaped the law of the sea. The historical roots 
of the EEZ lie in the trend of the coastal States after 1945 to assert rights and jurisdiction over an 
increasing area of seabed driven by a belief that an abundance of natural resources lay beneath.” 
(p.3) 
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 These provisions notwithstanding, Oxman(2006) observes that the EEZ “is already 
perceived in quasi-territorial terms” (p.839).4 For example, a UNESCO convention expanded 
the authority of coastal states in the EEZ and on the continental shelf to embrace marine 
archaeology. This matter “reflects a view of the EEZ as an appropriate vessel for 
accumulating additional coastal state competences. And each such move increases the 
territorial perception of the EEZ, which in turn facilitates further territorialization.” (Oxman, 
2006: 840). 
 In The “territorialization” of the Exclusive Economic Zone…,5 Sophia Kopela(2009) 
enumerates aspects of expansionist trends by coastal states, which rely on so-called 
“constructive ambiguities” of the LOS Convention:  
1) Military activities / military exercises-maneuvers: some states consider the 
performance of activities such as military exercises, live weapon tests, etc., as prejudicial to 
their national security and their resource sovereignty. Hence, they require prior consent for 
the performance of military activities in the EEZ, or even go further and prohibit them 
outright; 
2) Hydrographic surveys / intelligence-gathering activities: there is disagreement 
regarding hydrographic surveying and collection of other marine environmental data which 
are not resource related. The legislation of some states requires the consent of the coastal 
state for the performance of any kind of research or survey. This issue creates tension as 
hydrographic surveys are often performed for military purposes related to effective 
submarine operations, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and mine countermeasures; 
3) Jurisdiction related to installations / structures: some states have proclaimed their 
jurisdiction related to all types of installations, structures and devices for any purpose. Highly 
controversial are military installations, particularly sonar monitoring or surveillance systems; 
4) Jurisdiction related to customs: some states have claimed jurisdiction concerning 
custom-related issues, contrary to the provisions of the LOS Convention, sometimes in the 
EEZ as a whole, sometimes in specifically designated areas; 
5) Jurisdiction related to the Underwater Cultural Heritage;  
6) Restriction on the freedom to lay pipelines and cables;  
7) Restrictions upon navigational freedoms: some states have attempted to regulate 
or restrict the entry or passage of vessels through their EEZ. 
4 Cf. Beckman and Davenport(2012): “The EEZ has always been perceived in ‛quasi-territorial terms.’” 
(p.16) 
5 Regarding the term “territorialization”, Kopela(2009) explains: 
“The term territorialization may not seem appropriate in the sense that states have not raised 
sovereignty claims over the EEZ; however, they have tried to expand their rights and jurisdiction in 
such a way so as to assert as much control as possible for the protection of their national interests”. 
(p.2) 
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 All these trends can be related to the conception of borders as markers of territory 
and as membranes: the passing of legislation related to the control of goods, people, and 
activities, the monitoring of its observation and its enforcement through security or military 
forces. The latter occurs in order to assert the presence of the coastal state, not only for third 
states, but also for the local national audience to see that the state is active. The Indian and 
Pacific Oceans provide plenty of examples of these trends, as I will show in the following 
section. 
 
III. Territorialization in the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
 The coastal States of the Indian and Pacific Oceans have taken part in the expansion 
of territoriality seaward. They have passed plenty of legislation related to jurisdiction. 
Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Pakistan have provisions requiring prior consent for 
their performance of military activities in their EEZ. Iran has prohibited any foreign military 
activities and practices, collection of information and “any other activity inconsistent with its 
rights and interests.” China considers the carrying out of military activities as prejudicial to 
the “peaceful purposes” provision of the LOS Convention. North Korea has established a 50-
nautical-mile military zone where foreign military vessels and planes are prohibited (Kopela, 
2009: Table I). 
Regarding hydrographic surveys, Comoros, India, Iran, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan and Philippines require the consent of the state for the 
performance of any kind of research or survey. Moreover, North Korea explicitly prohibits the 
taking of photographs and any investigation or survey (Kopela, 2009: Table II). China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sri 
Lanka and Yemen have passed legislation related to all types of installations, structures and 
devices for any purpose and not solely for the purposes established in article 56 (Kopela, 
2009: Table III). India and Pakistan have passed legislation concerning custom-related 
jurisdiction in specifically designated areas in the EEZ (Kopela, 2009: Table IV). China and 
Iran require authorization for the laying, maintenance or repair of submarine pipelines or 
cables (Kopela, 2009: Table VI). Finally, Maldives requires prior authorization for the entry of 
all foreign vessels in its EEZ; India and Pakistan have designated areas in the EEZ where 
the entry and passage of foreign ships will be regulated by the establishment of fairways, 
sea-lanes and traffic separation schemes; North Korea has established a 50-nautical-mile 
military zone where navigation and overflight is to be exercised with the state’s consent 
(Kopela, 2009: Table VIII). 
The coastal States have not only passed legislation, but also attempted to monitor 
and enforce their observance. The South China Sea has historically been the most 
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contentious area regarding these aspects. During and after negotiations at UNCLOS III, the 
coastal states of the South China Sea (in particular Vietnam, China and the Philippines), 
apart from ratifying the LOS Convention and enacting domestic maritime legislation, have 
taken a number of actions such as deployment of military troops and occupation of islands 
(Song and Tønnesson, 2013: 243). For example, in March 1989, China established a Spratly 
front line headquarters to command a patrol mission and later in August, placed “sovereignty 
markers” in six maritime features. In 1992, following legislation and oil concessions which 
were protested by Vietnam, China warned that it would use its navy to enforce the contract 
and placed more sovereignty markers (Song and Tønnesson, 2013: 244-245). Ever since, 
China, Vietnam and the Philippines have been constantly observing and accusing each 
other of exceeding themselves in territoriality assertiveness (Panda, 2016). There are plenty 
of examples, the most recent of which occurred in January 2016, when China landed a 
civilian aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef, drawing a sharp reaction from the Vietnamese 
government. Moreover, there have been several incidents and standoffs between Chinese 
warships and Vietnamese fishermen, or even between Chinese and Vietnamese warships.6 
A very famous incident concerning military-related intelligence gathering activities in 
the South China Sea occurred on 8th March 2009, when five Chinese vessels blocked and 
surrounded a US surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, 75 nautical miles from Hainan 
Islands. China and the USA continue to have confronting positions regarding these kind of 
activities. USA conducts so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FON, or FONOPS), 
which involve naval units transiting disputed areas to avoid setting the precedent that the 
international community has adopted unlawful claims.7In particular, theUSA considers that 
Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea are not legitimate and that China 
endangers freedom of navigation. Chinese position is that these “operational assertions” are 
a provocation and a sign of hypocrisy by the USA, “a non-member of UNCLOS, and a non-
related party to the South China Sea disputes (…) (who) continuously justifies its 
intercessions into the dispute as a protector of UNCLOS” (Colonel Xiaoqin Shi, 2015; Bo, 
2015). However, there is also the argument that FONOPS have long been a part of US 
foreign policy and should not be seen as a sign that diplomacy has been set aside (Rapp-
Hooper, 2015).8 The controversy between China and the US on this matter is perhaps the 
current clearest example of the traditional dispute between a coastal state and a maritime 
power regarding freedom of navigation. 
6 For a timeline of events in the East and South China see for example 
http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline. 
7 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/iso/15962.htm. 
8 See also Klein and Rapp-Hooper (2015), Odom (2015). 
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This kind of incidents is not exclusive of the South China Sea, though. In 2001, the 
Japanese Coast Guard pursued a North Korean spy vessel in its EEZ. Japan protested 
against similar activities performed by China. India has also protested against the USA for 
oceanographic survey operations related to military data gathering (Kopela, 2009:6). 
The Asian coastal States continue to make preparations to enhance their monitoring 
and control capacities. China is building a second aircraft carrier, the first to be built 
indigenously (Tiezzi, 2016). Vietnam commissioned two new Russian-made Kilo-class 
diesel-electric submarines and revealed an indigenous high-altitude long-endurance 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for patrolling the South China Sea (Gady, 2015a; 2015b). 
The Philippines received recently one Japanese and four US patrol vessels to enhance its 
navy’s capacity to patrol and enforce fisheries-related laws (Parameswaran 2015a, 2015b). 
Indonesia has made plans to create by 2024 a modernized green-water navy capable of 
undertaking an array of missionswithin the immediate regional waters while having limited 
ability to project force into distant waters (Singh, 2015), as part of its Global Maritime 
Fulcrum vision (Widodo, 2014). 
India, on its part, has revealed a new Indian Maritime Strategy (Singh, 2015) and a 
plan for civilian and military development of Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI), the aim of 
which is to turn ANI into a hub of repair ship industry, boost tourism potential and build it up 
in military terms (Arora, 2015: Pandit, 2015; Roy, 2015).9Sanat Kaul, former administrator of 
the islands, has published almost at the same time a book describing the policies to be 
pursued, also and especially concerning soft power and the image of India, with the purpose 
of changing the perception of both Indians and foreigners with regard to India’s reach in the 
Indian Ocean (Kaul, 2015).  
The importance of borders as social constructions can also be observed in reference 
to the names of seas and islands, which have political implications. It is easy to imagine why 
nationals of Iran, India, China, the Philippines and Japan are eager to see that international 
cartography keeps the names of “Persian Gulf,” “Indian Ocean,” “South and East China 
Seas,” “Philippine Sea” and “Sea of Japan,” respectively. However, since the 1960s, due to 
the rivalry between Iran and the Arab states, along with the emergence of Arab nationalism, 
some Arabian states have preferred to speak of the “Arabian Gulf” (Abedin, 2004; Bosworth, 
1980). The South China Sea has traditionally been named “East Sea” by the Vietnamese. 
Recently, some Philippine government agencies, following the lead of President Aquino after 
an escalation on the Spratly Islands disputes, started using the neologism “West Philippine 
Sea” to refer to the South China Sea (Quismundo, 2011). The Vietnamese Nguyen Thai Hoc 
Foundation (NTHF) has launched an initiative to rename the sea as “Southeast Asia Sea,” to 
9 See also Watson (2015). 
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make clear that the sea is not restricted to a specific country.10 There is also a naming 
dispute on the Sea of Japan. South Koreans prefer to call it “East Sea” and North Koreans 
“East Sea of Korea” (The Issue of the Name of the Sea of Japan, 2015). All these disputes 
refer to the notion that borders define lines for the formation of identities along the binary 
distinction between “us” and “them”. 
 
Conclusions 
 Bernard H. Oxman, upon commenting the LOS Convention, makes the observation 
that international law at any given time represents an equilibrium between opposing 
pressures (Oxman, 2006: 850).  
In this context, when asking whether UNCLOS has enhanced cooperation or 
contributed to further conflict, it is important to understand that UNCLOS is the result of two 
opposite forces: a territorializing pressure emerging from the coastal states and an 
internationalizing pressure that vows for freedom of navigation and global governance of the 
commons.Where the seas are open as in South America, the EEZ is relatively 
unproblematic. The Indian and Western Pacific Oceans, however, are likely to present 
numerous conflicts. 
 These opposing pressures are also reflected in IR approaches to the study of 
borders. Both Realism and Liberal Institutionalism start from state-oriented stances. 
However, whereas Realists focus on the production of borders, i.e. on boundary 
demarcation and border management within the wider context of competitive relationships 
between rivalling neighbors that struggle to survive, Liberal Institutionalism is more 
concerned with the question of how to overcome obstacles to transactions and cooperation, 
and have offered models of integration, international interaction and economic 
interdependence (Kuzmits, 2013: 30, 35). 
 The different security constructions or discourses lie in the interphase between 
theory and policy. Rumley, Doyle and Chaturvedi (2012) explain how the regional security 
debate in the Indo-Pacific is framed within competing regional (maritime) security 
constructions: conservative commentators refer to an Indo-Pacific Region, a realm of 
nationalism where hard power and traditional security play the leading role, and policy is 
conducted by Departments of Defense;  liberal commentators refer to an Indian Ocean 
Region, a realm of pan-regionalism where soft power matters, diplomacy plays the main role 
and policy is conducted by Foreign Affairs departments; there is also a middle ground 
10 See the website of the Nguyen Thai Hoc Foundation 
(http://www.nguyenthaihocfoundation.org/index_en.php). 
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construction, the so-called East Indian Ocean, where both liberal and conservative 
commentators refer to limited diplomacy and both soft and hard power interact. 
 Only time will tell whether the balance breaks in favor of one of the opposing 
pressures, and the issue is embedded in a wider framework of discussion about the future of 
sovereignty and territoriality.When it comes specifically to maritime territoriality and maritime 
security, the Indian and Pacific Oceans will prove a crucial region to observe future 
developments. This is due to the particular geographical features of the Asian Rimland, 
which provide the Indian and Pacific Oceans with enclosed marginal seas and generate 
disputes like no other region in the world. 
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